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Abstract: In this paper we study the determinants of the counterpart choice in the U.S. market for SO2 
allowances. Counterparts can be chosen among three alternatives proved to be independent: 
market makers, brokers or private. Privates are mostly U.S. electricity generators. We find 
that the SO2 allowances market, as the electricity market, is regionalized. The national 
dimension only appears when there are local imbalances that give incentives to search for a 
better price outside of the region. Additionally, our results suggest that agents like counterpart 
differentiation i.e. they value positively the presence of few market makers, possibly with 
large stocks but they also value positively the presence of many brokers (and privates). In line 
with previous literature results, we also find agents prefer market makers when placing large 
size orders and that the preference for market makers increases on time due to the increase in 
the counterpart risk. Finally, we also identify the influence of the regulatory framework, i.e. 
the division in phases and the chosen allowance surrender date, in the counterpart choice. The 
previous results are robust to Enron’s abnormal behavior during 2000-2001 and its posterior 
bankruptcy. 
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1 Introduction
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances are property rights that have
been introduced as part of the environmental regulation supported by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reduce the SO2
emissions produced by fossil fueled electricity generators. The creation
of a tradable property rights coinciding with the preestablished pollu-
tion reduction target is generally called cap-and-trade regulation and, in
this case, is commonly known as the "Acid Rain Program". Its name
refers to the acid rain provoked in certain areas of the U.S. due to SO2
emissions. The cap is reected in the total amount of allowances created
and allocated by the EPA. These allowances are allocated for free1 on
a yearly basis among electricity generating units. To comply with the
environmental regulation, electricity generators must surrender to the
EPA an amount of allowances equal to veried emissions every year (by
the 1st of March). The allowances that are not surrendered to the EPA
can be banked (i.e. saved) for use or trade in subsequent years. The idea
behind the creation of the SO2 market is that generators with di¤erent
pollution abatement costs are able to exchange their surplus or decit of
allowances throughout the year (and across time), equalizing marginal
abatement costs to the unique allowance price. To this end, generators
hold an inventory of SO2 allowance and they enter the market to opti-
mize such allowance holdings, being able to trade among themselves or
with other agents not subject to the environmental regulation such as
professional traders (brokers and market makers).
When a private agent (an electricity generator) in the SO2 allowance
market wants to place an order, he must choose between three mutually
exclusive type of trading counterparts (from now on simply counterparts
or alternatives). Those alternatives are: "broker", "market maker", or
another "private" counterpart. In this paper we investigate the determi-
nants of this choice. In particular, we focus on the way agents character-
istics, transactions characteristics and each alternatives characteristics
impact on the counterpart choice. The intuition behind this is the follow-
ing: when choosing a counterpart from which to buy a certain amount
of allowances, the agent searches for the lowest allowance price and the
lowest costs (and risks) associated to the transaction. In this paper we
only account for the latter motivation due to the lack of price informa-
tion. Then, depending on the market conditions at each point in time
(i.e. local scarcity of allowances, the time left before the next allowances
surrender date, whether the transaction is in Phase I or in Phase II), the
characteristics of the transaction the agent wishes to undertake (e.g. the
1Table A of the U.S. Clean Air Act lists allowance allocations.
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size of the transaction) and the distinctive characteristics of each type of
counterpart (i.e. the information available about them, the service pro-
vided, how di¢ cult is to nd them), agents prefer one alternative over
the other. To this end, we are able to understand which are the char-
acteristics of each counterpart that agents value the most and how this
preference may change with the specic characteristics of transactions.
Market microstructure literature underlines the di¢ culty of studying
and regulating decentralized markets since each transaction is unknown
to other market participants (OHara, 1995). By means of understand-
ing the determinants behind agentscounterpart choice, we are able to
throw some light on some issues of crucial importance for regulatory
policy, namely: (i) how the structure of the underlying electricity mar-
ket inuences agentstrading behavior in the permits market; (ii) how
the rules imposed by the environmental regulation (e.g. having di¤erent
number of agents entering the market in subsequent phases or having
a xed allowance surrender date) impact on the number (and type) of
agents entering the market2 and consequently on market evolution; and
(iii) which is the role of professional traders as the market evolves and if
their presence has an impact on the environmental regulations e¢ ciency.
A broker is experienced in the negotiation of standard and non-
standard volumes, as well as in the negotiation of trading and credit
terms with a large number of market participants. Brokers also provide
information regarding region-specic market conditions and rules, and
benet from economies of scale that reduce search costs and allow them
to desegregate single orders into multiple transactions. Brokers do not
trade on their own behalf but negotiate the price and trading condi-
tions with one or several third parties in the name of an agent. A xed
brokerage fee must be paid to trade with a broker.
A market maker, instead, trades on his own behalf and for this rea-
son he holds allowances stocks. Holding stocks force market makers to
have a detailed knowledge of the underlying fundamentals of the mar-
ket. This knowledge is reected in the (bid and ask) prices at which
they stand ready to buy and sell. Market makers provide continuity to
the market, particularly in newly created markets where transactions are
discontinuous due to the small number of participants and their lack of
trading experience. Market makers also play a very important role once
the market has developed and the number of participants has increased.
This is the case because as the number of participants increases, the
counterpart risk associated to each transaction also increases.
Besides trading with professional traders, another possibility is to
2Measuring the number of agents active in a certain market is a way of building
a measure of liquidity and therefore a measure of market e¢ ciency.
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trade with a private counterpart, most likely an electricity generator
that operates in one or more of the U.S. states subject to the Acid Rain
Program. The market for electricity, rather than national, is a regional
market. According to Joskow (1997), in 1997 retail consumers still had
to buy their electricity from the legal monopoly supplier, generally ver-
tically integrated. In this line, Joskow (2005) explains how the e¤orts
to introduce competition in the electricity market and to connect local
electricity grids to create a competitive nation-wide market have not
succeeded so far. Such regional dimension might be reected in the SO2
market. Local electricity market conditions are likely to drive the local
supply/demand of SO2 allowances as they are an input for electricity
production, and electricity generators are the main actors in the SO2
market. Furthermore, generators operating in the same region are likely
to be partners/competitors in the local electricity market and linked by
well established commercial relationships. The existence of long term
business relationships allows them to reduce search costs when trading
allowances among each other, and generate scope economies by using well
established communication channels. Additionally, the information re-
garding the counterpart and the allowances market conditions are grater
within their own region, which may inuence the counterpart choice.
To study the determinants of the trading counterpart choice, we have
obtained3 a database that collects all transactions registered in the Al-
lowance Tracking System (ATS) of the EPA between January 1995 and
December4 2005. From the database we selected all transactions in which
a private agent appears as a buyer. We extracted those transactions be-
cause we are only interested in private counterparts choice. We have
checked that, if we had considered transactions that have a private agent
as a seller instead of a buyer, results would mirror the results stated
hereafter. To account for the regional dimension and the link between
the SO2 market and the electricity market we have completed our data-
base with data on local electric market conditions. Firstly, we have
divided the U.S. in nine regions using the regionalization criterion of
the Energy Information Administration5 (EIA) Census Division. Then,
we have identied the region to which each generator belongs. Within
the same regionalization criterion we have also identied the localization
of each professional trader. Usually, market makers trade nation-wide
while brokers just trade across more than one region. Secondly, we have
3This database was rst given to us by Denny Ellerman and then updated with
data obtained in the ATS of the EPA.
4We have excluded auction data as well as compensation and surrender allowance
transfers.
5See http://www.eia.doe.gov/.
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collected data on the monthly average retail price at a regional level to
be able to account for local shocks in the supply/demand of electricity,
and in general for unobserved local heterogeneity as determinants for
the counterpart choice.
We nd evidence to support the hypothesis that the SO2 market in-
herits the local dimension from the electricity market and that this de-
termines the way agents choose their trading counterpart. This nding
may be important from a regulatory perspective. As mentioned before,
the principle behind the creation of this market is creating the possi-
bility of abating emissions at the lowest marginal cost nationwide. If
trade among privates takes place mostly regionally, the main objective
of the creation of this market would not be completely fullled. In-
stead, the national dimension prevails when there are local imbalances
in the supply or demand of allowances, which also inuences agents
preferences with respect to each type of trading counterpart. We nd
that, in average, generators prefer to trade within their own region with
other generators or brokers. On the other hand, when there is a shock in
the local electricity market that makes SO2 allowances locally scarce, our
results show that generators are more likely to buy allowances from mar-
ket makers. These results suggest that the counterpart risk is perceived
as higher in the nation-wide market. Additionally, this suggests that
professional traders, in particular market makers, by posting a single al-
lowance (bid-ask) price, serve as a link between local allowance markets
making it possible to equalize marginal abatement costs nationwide, i.e.
increasing the e¢ ciency of the environmental regulation itself.
Rust and Hall (2003) and Neeman and Vulkan (2003) rely on dynamic
models to investigate the reasons behind the coexistence of centralized
options (i.e. market makers) and negotiated trade6 (i.e. bilateral trade
and brokered trade). In this sense, Rust and Hall (2003) and Neeman
and Vulkan (2003) consider the alternatives "broker" and "private" as
equivalent since both trade at negotiated prices. On the other hand,
the nancial market theory (see Barber and Odean, 2008) and behav-
ioral economics theory (see Shapira and Venezia, 1998) consider that, in
most markets, the relevant distinction is the one between professional
(brokers and market makers) and non-professional traders. In this paper
we consider the three counterpart alternatives as independent7 nding
6Their setting is very di¤erent from ours as well as their objetives. Their main
nding is that buyers with the highest valuation for the homogeneous good trade
with the market maker, while the others search for better deals in the negotiated
market. This result holds when the market maker has a marginal cost of executing
transactions lower than the least e¢ cient broker.
7We validate the assumption using the Hausman test for independence of irrel-
evant alternatives (IIA) (Hausman, 1978) as well as the Small-Hsiao specication
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that each explanatory variable inuences the preference for each type of
counterpart quite di¤erently. This is the case, for example, of market
participation. Intuition suggests that as the number of participants of a
certain type, say brokers, increases, the utility derived from trading with
a counterpart of that type also increases due to lower search cost associ-
ated with that alternative. In fact, our ndings with respect to brokers
are in line with this intuition. Additionally, we nd that the marginal
utility derived from an increase in the number of private counterparts is
positive but very low with respect to the marginal utility derived from
an increase in brokers market participation. This is the case because
private participation is already very high in relation to the participation
of brokers (search costs related to that alternative are already low). On
the contrary, we nd that agents derive a positive marginal utility from
a decrease in the number of market makers. This result suggests that
generators prefer the presence of a relatively small number of market
makers of a larger size to the existence of a large number of market
makers, each with smaller stocks available. This is in line with Miao
(2006) who, based on a search model of centralized versus decentral-
ized trade, shows that, unlike competitive market making, monopolistic
market-making may improve social welfare because it partially internal-
izes the externalities of bidask prices on the decentralized market8.
In relation to the transactions size, we nd that agents prefer to
trade with market makers as the size increases, whereas size makes no
di¤erence when choosing among private and brokers. This result may be
due to the di¢ culty in nding a single counterpart to fulll big orders.
These results regarding alternativesmarket participation and transac-
tionssize suggest that agents value positively counterpart diversica-
tion. Then, the presence of market makers and brokers increase the
utility derived from trading in the SO2 market.
In relation to market conditions given by the regulation, we inves-
tigate how the counterpart choice is inuenced, rstly, by the need of
immediacy and the increase of private participants when the allowance
surrender date is approaching, and secondly, by the change in the market
conguration when passing from Phase I to Phase II. We nd that, dur-
ing Phase II, agents are more likely to prefer professional traders. This
result is due to the increase in the counterpart identication costs and
on the increasing need of disaggregating each order in multiple trans-
actions due to the small size of the new market participants. Finally,
test (see Small and Hsiao, 1985 and Cheng and Long, 2007). Results of both tests
support the IIA hypothesis.
8This is the case of the monopolistic specialists system on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE).
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we account for changes in preferences across alternatives as the market
develops. We nd that trade with private counterparts increases with
time (as more rms are covered by the regulation) but trade with market
makers increases even more the last two years considered. Additionally,
we nd there is no signicant change in the preference for brokers with
time.
Enrons activity was very important in the SO2 market during 2000
and until its bankruptcy in 2001. One concern is that the increase in En-
rons market activity, measured in terms of volume and in terms of num-
ber of transactions, was most likely due to fraudulent behavior. There-
fore, it might be the case that our results are a¤ected by this abnormal
behavior. A rst approach to assess this possibility consists in removing
from our data all transactions concluded during the years 2000 and 2001,
when Enrons activity was particularly relevant. Our results in this case
are in line with those obtained using the full sample, suggesting that our
results are robust to Enrons behavior during these years.
Another concern is that Enrons disappearance may cause a dramatic
change in agents preferences with respect to the counterpart choice.
With respect to this last point, Jue et al. (2004) build a model of
oligopolistic competition between brokers (called middlemen) and mar-
ket makers. They nd that the exit of a market maker results in a shift
of trade from the latter to brokers, but that after transition (roughly 2
months in their empirical application) trade volumes by alternative go
back to pre-exit levels. To account for the change in preferences after
Enrons disappearance we consider two subsamples, before Enron bank-
ruptcy (from 1995 to 2001) and after (from 2002 to 2005). We nd that
the results based on the full sample still hold in the two subsamples even
if, in line with Jue et al., (2004), immediately after Enrons bankruptcy
we observe a substitution of market makers by brokers.
As far as we know this is the rst attempt to study the counterpart
choice in an emission allowance market. Similar empirical papers have
been written on the choice of competing trading platforms (see Hendel
et al., 2007 and Bernheim and Meer, 2008 for applications to the hous-
ing market). Both Hendel et al. (2007) and Bernheim and Meer (2008)
show that agents using a broker nd a counterpart quicker than the ones
selling bilaterally. Additionally, Hendel et al. (2007) nd that bilateral
trade is associated with agents that are either better bargainers or in
need of less immediacy. In this sense, Hendel et al. (2007) show how in-
dividual characteristics and platform characteristics inuence the choice
between bilateral trade and brokered trade. This "di¤erentiation" be-
tween platforms is in line with our results: since alternative counterparts
are di¤erent, one will be chosen over the other depending on the transac-
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tion and counterpart characteristics. In fact, Hendel et al. (2007) claim
that it might be socially e¢ cient to have multiple platforms (in our case
alternatives), o¤ering di¤erent service levels, catering to di¤erent type
of houses and sellers (in our case transactions and agents).
Finally, other related literature is on the informational motives for
self-selection into trading venues that o¤er di¤erent services and trading
conditions. Barclay et al. (2003) study competition between Electronic
Communication Networks and NASDAQ, whereas Bessminder and Kauf-
man (1997) study competition between the National Association of Se-
curity Dealers and the NYSE. Both nd, as we do, that agents seeking to
trade large quantities usually go to the centralized market since multiple
transactions are needed to full a single order of large size.
In Section 2 we describe our data and provide some descriptive statis-
tics. In Section 3 we introduce our trading counterpart choice model. In
Section 4 we discuss identication assumptions. In Section 5 we present
the estimation results and in Section 6 we assess the goodness of t of
the model. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 Stylized facts and data description
The creation of the market for emissions has established the SO2 al-
lowances as an additional electricity production input. The net short
or long position in SO2 allowances depends on each periods di¤erence
between the allowances that a generator needs for production and the
number of allowances received, yearly, from the EPA. In our data, we
observe that each generator enters the market more than once a week
and, in some cases, more than once a day. This frequency suggests that
rms enter this market to optimize their allowance holdings. Once they
decided to enter the market, generators choose their trading counter-
parts for each transaction depending on the transaction characteristics,
on the information they have regarding each alternative (and the asso-
ciated search costs) and on market conditions both of the SO2 market
and of the underlying electricity market.
2.1 Trading data
The data regarding transaction and alternatives characteristics as de-
terminants for the counterpart choice is extracted from the Allowance
Tracking System (ATS) of the EPA. We consider all transfers registered
in the ATS between January 1995 and December 2005 after excluding
auction data as well as compensation and surrender allowance transfers.
This gives a database accounting for 32.655 transactions over 10 years.
The ATS is an automated system for tracking allowance transfers
(and holdings). As described in Solomon (1998), all allowance trades
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and transfers are triggered by the submission of an allowance trans-
fer form signed by the two parties. Allowances can be held in "unit
accounts" belonging to power plants required to comply with the Acid
Rain Program or in "general accounts" for trading allowances. Only unit
accounts are subject to allowance deductions to cover annual SO2 emis-
sions. Electricity generators generally hold "unit accounts" from where
the veried emissions by generating unit are deducted and a "general
account" to trade SO2 allowances. By contrast, professional traders just
hold "general accounts". We consider as brokers all professional traders
that do not hold stocks in their accounts at the end of each compliance
period9. We consider as market makers all professional traders that hold
stocks by that time.
The ATS is the primary source of allowance-trading data. However it
will not include all transactions at any given time since the submission of
allowance trade information to the EPA is voluntary and the only dead-
line is March the 1st, date when EPA deduces from unit accounts the
amount of allowances needed to cover the previous year SO2 emissions.
Consequently, no measure based on the ATS can be certain of including
100 percent of transactions. This will probably make our model under-
estimate brokerages importance: brokers, as they do not hold stocks
for themselves, do not necessarily need to open a general account in the
ATS. In this sense, transaction originally negotiated through a broker
may appear in our database as one or many transactions between private
counterparts. However, Joskow et al. (1998) express that, to their un-
derstanding, prompt recording of transactions was the rule rather than
the exception and that transactions registered as "private transfers" in
the ATS are the best available lower-bound estimate of transactions be-
tween privates, market makers and brokers.
2.2 Transactionscharacteristics and market condi-
tions imposed by regulation
We observe di¤erences in the characteristics of transactions undertaken
with di¤erent type of counterparts, as well as, di¤erences in the trad-
ing behavior as market conditions change (both inside the year and as
time goes by) due to the rules imposed by the environmental regulation.
Figure 4 shows that the average transaction size is higher when the coun-
terpart chosen is a market maker. This could be the case because, when
placing orders of a large size, agents wish to avoid disaggregating a single
order in several transactions. Figure 5 shows an increase in the number
9If some profesional trader holds less than 1000 allowances at the end of each
period but in the following months the stock holding tends to zero it is also considered
as broker.
9
of transactions during the two months prior to the allowance surrender
date, March the 1st. The change in counterpart preferences during these
two months can be learnt from Table 3 for Phase I and from Table 4 for
Phase II. We observe that in Phase I the number of transactions done
with private counterparts is higher during the rst bimester whereas,
in Phase II, also the number of transactions done with market makers
increases during these two months.
During Phase I, only the 263 dirtiest generating units were subject to
the Acid Rain program and another 111 units voluntary opted into this
phase. These 374 units belonged to 110 generators spread over the US
territory. During Phase II, beginning in 2000, all fossil-red generating
units greater than 25 MWe were subject to SO2 cap, regardless of histor-
ical emission rates. This results in a total of nearly 4000 units subject to
the program in Phase II (see Ellerman, 2003 for details). Table 5 shows
each type of agents participating in the market yearly10 considering all
unit accounts belonging to the same company as accounts belonging to a
single agent. This table shows the important increase of private agents
participation starting in 2000.
The emission reduction required in Phase II is stronger (9 million
ton), but the number of allowances available did not decreased signi-
cantly since 30% of allowances distributed between 1995 and 1999 where
banked (i.e. saved) and, according to Ellerman and Montero (2005),
only one third where used to cover emissions in excess of the number
of new vintage allowances issued between 2000 and 2002. We observe
that the total volume of trade doubles the rst year of Phase II reaching
almost 22 million allowances a year (see Table 1) and that the Phase II
average yearly volume of allowances traded is always higher than 13 mil-
lion, much higher than the average yearly volume of allowances traded
during Phase I (see Figure 6). Similarly, the number of transactions
increased steadily over time (see Figure 8). The change in market struc-
ture in terms of number of participants as well as the distribution of a
xed amount of allowances among a larger number of rms may provoke
an important change in market structure inuencing the preference for
counterparts.
2.3 Counterpart characteristics
The larger the number of agents belonging to a specic group the lower
the search costs associated to that group. Participation of each type of
counterpart in terms of volume and in terms of number of transactions
can be seen in Figures 6-9. We have intentionally separated Enrons par-
10Overall, we consider 2.011 distinct allowance accounts belonging to non-
professional traders.
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ticipation from the other market makers since we observe an abnormal
behavior of Enron during 2000 and 2001, both in terms of volume and
in terms of number of transactions (see for example the evolution of the
number of transactions in Figure 9). Enrons abnormal behavior a¤ects
the weight of market makers volume in relation to other alternatives
during the year 2000 and we observe a substitution of market makers
for brokers in 2001 (see Figure 9 and Figure 11 in comparison with Fig-
ure 10). This phenomena disappears after Enrons default in December
2001. Hereafter we account for the possible impact of Enrons behavior
on our estimation results.
2.4 Local market conditions
We cross-reference the ATS transactions data with data on local electric
market conditions. Since we are interested in capturing how di¤erences
in local demand/supply for electricity may impact agentstrading be-
havior in the SO2 market, we divide the U.S. in nine regions according
to the Energy Information Administration11 (EIA) Census Division (see
Table 2). This division of the U.S. territory is the one used by the EIAs
National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) to account for nine local end-
use demand modules12. We have created a 10th region to which all rms
operating nationwide or by denition without a single localization (for
instance some market makers) belong. The number of agents belonging
to each region in our data is summarized in Table 2. Naturally, there
are big groups that operate more than one utility across more than one
region but not yet nation-wide (e.g. SOCO13 or AEP14). In this cases
we assign each "unit account" to the region it belongs and the "general
account" to the headquarters region. We will control for the e¤ect that
intragroup transactions may have in our estimation.
There is no U.S. national market for electricity. Then, the regional
structure of the electricity market may be reected in the SO2 mar-
ket. According to Joskow (1997), in 1997 retail consumers still had to
buy their electricity from the regulated monopoly supplier that had the
legal right to distribute electricity at their locations and at prices ap-
proved by the state regulatory commission. Most of these utilities had
historically been vertically integrated operating the four primary elec-
11See http://www.eia.doe.gov/.
12An alternative is to use the regionalization of the Electricity Market Module (see
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/supplement/supmap.pdf).We consider this alternative to
be less satisfying since it would include indistinctly changes in local demand for
electricity and changes in the wholesale electricity market structure across time.
13SOCO stands for Southern Company. For more details see
http://www.southerncompany.com/aboutus/about.aspx
14AEP stands for American Electric Power. See http://www.aep.com/about/
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tricity supply functions: generation, transmission, distribution and re-
tailing. In late 1999 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
started moving towards the introduction of institutional change in the
wholesale electricity market with the intension of connecting local grids
and increasing competition. This stopped after Californias 2000-2001
electricity crisis (see Joskow, 2005 for details). The previous evidence
highlights that, during the period of this study, the electricity market
is divided in local markets poorly interconnected. Additionally, agents
participating in each local market have well established business rela-
tions, in fact, they are likely to be either competitors or partners (some
even vertically integrated in the near past) in the wholesale electricity
market and able to use well established communication channels. Most
likely, this represents an informational advantage when trading SO2 al-
lowances with each other. In such case we expect to observe a larger
amount of intra-regional private trade. Tables 6 and 7 show the impor-
tance of intra-regional trade. We observe that most brokers and market
makers trade is national whereas most of private transactions are local.
3 Trading counterpart model
From the point of view of the estimation method, our model is similar
to the ones used by the labor selection theory (see for example Boskin,
1974). Similarly to an agent that must choose a job according to his
skills and the benets o¤ered by the employer, when an agent enters the
market to buy a certain amount of SO2 allowances, he faces the prob-
lem of choosing a counterpart depending on his characteristics, on those
of the transaction, on market characteristics and on counterpart char-
acteristics. We assume that agents maximize their utilities (or prots)
independently of what they have chosen in previous transactions. Then,
they maximize:
U ij = V
i
j + "
i
j; (1)
where i indexes each transaction15 and j indexes possible counterparts
of the set J = fb;m; pg where b stands for broker, m for market maker
and p for private.
In equation (1), V ij denotes the deterministic part which is a function
of observable characteristics and "ij denotes the stochastic part which
represents the unobserved characteristics. To implement the model we
must specify a functional form for the deterministic component of the
utility function as well as a distributional assumption regarding the idio-
syncratic component. In this regard, we assume that V ij is a linear
function of: (i) a component that represents the participation in the
15Notice that we consider buy contracts placed by private agents.
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market of each alternative -in number of participants per year- (denoted
participij) as a proxy for the supply of each type of counterpart (see sum-
mary statistics in Table 5); (ii) a component (sameri) that reects the
utility (due to an informational advantage) derived from trading with
a counterpart that is located in the same region as opposed to a dif-
ferent region (see Table 8).; (iii) two components that capture shocks
in the supply/demand in the local electricity market (difdifposi and
difdifnegi); (iv) a dummy variable that accounts for the allowance ver-
ication period as opposed to the rest of the year (jf i); (v) a dummy
component capturing the utility derived from trading during Phase II
as opposed to Phase I (phi); (vi) a group of dummies accounting for re-
gional heterogeneity (rb#i) that take the value one for the region where
the buying agent belongs; (vii) a component specic to the size of the
transaction measured by the amount of allowances traded (qasci); and
(viii) three components that capture the change in the buyers pref-
erences over time regarding each counterpart (ytrendj, ytrendsqj with
intercept ascj). When considered appropriate, we will also consider the
interaction between some of these components.
The construction of the variables (difdifpos and difdifneg) is worth
a few words. Figure 12 shows there are some regions where the monthly
retail electricity price is systematically below or systematically above the
national average. This is due to the fact that some regions have more
resources for electricity production than others. On the other hand,
Figure 12 shows that this di¤erence between the regional price and the
national average may increase or decrease up to three times during the
period of our study, suggesting the presence of local supply/demand
shocks. Since we are interested in accounting for the latter local shocks
that may make allowances locally scarce (or abundant) as compared to
the rest of the territory, we must control for the shocks that a¤ect all
regions which are captured by changes in the national average price.
Consequently, we rst consider the di¤erence between the monthly price
in the region (pr#) and the monthly national average (pn). Then, we
compare (subtract) it with the mean annual di¤erence between those
prices (meana(pr#   pn)). That is, we dene difdif = pr#   pn  
meana(pr#   pn): Finally, we dene difdifpos to be equal to difdif
when the latter is positive, zero otherwise, whereas difdifneg is equal to
the absolute value of difdif when the latter is negative, zero otherwise.
Summary statistics for the latter variables are reported in Table 9.
In our model, the probability of choosing a certain counterpart among
the three possible alternatives is based on the di¤erence in utility from
choosing that counterpart over the utility from choosing the others. Con-
sequently, utilities are normalized using an alternative of reference, in
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our case alternative private (p), and di¤erences in utilities are computed
with respect to the utility of choosing the alternative of reference. This
normalization is common practice in conditional logit models as the one
used herein (see McFadden, 1973 for details, McFadden, 1974 for an
example and Manski, 2001 for a summary on the estimation method).
Under the previous assumptions the deterministic part of the utility
function for each choice can then be expressed as
V ip = p0particip
i
p; (2)
V ib =
 
b0particip
i
b + b1samer
i + b2difdifpos
i + :::

; (3)
V im=
 
m0particip
i
m + m1samer
i + m2difdifpos
i + :::

(4)
where jn are the parameters for each alternative j 2 J = fp; b;mg
and where all parameters for the alternative of reference p are zero due
to normalization except for p0.
In the case of the SO2 market, the three alternatives appear to be
very di¤erent. Brokers are able to assist in complex transactions and
in the negotiation of transaction and credit conditions whereas private
counterparts are agents that enter the market to comply with the envi-
ronmental regulation and may be partners (or competitors) if belonging
to the same local electricity market. Also, professional traders seem to
be very di¤erent one from another in the SO2 market: by holding stocks
and standing ready to buy or sell, market makers reduce the counterpart
risk whereas brokers just reduce search costs and customize transaction.
Then, the three mutually exclusive alternatives seem to be independent.
We therefore use a conditional logit model and, to validate this intuition,
we apply the Hausman test for independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) (see Hausman, 1978 and Cheng and Long, 2007).
The probability that alternative k 2 J is chosen for transaction i is
then
P ik = P

U ik > U
i
m8m 6= k

; (5)
where we consider a distribution of U ij such that the probability of ties is
zero. In particular, if we assume that the error terms in (1) are indepen-
dent and identically distributed (iid) as extreme value distribution with
constant variance (McFadden, 1973), the probability that alternative
k 2 J is chosen can be expressed as:
P iCLk =
eV
i
kPJ
1 e
V ij
; k 2 J: (6)
We estimate these probabilities using the maximum likelihood (ML)
method.
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Our empirical model di¤ers from the theoretical models on the choice
between market makers and bilateral trade (see Rust and Hall, 2003 and
Neeman and Vulkan, 2003) in that we focus on the counterpart choice
based on given characteristics of the transaction (among other, the size
of each alternative and of the transaction and the moment in which the
transaction was realized) rather than explaining the choice of size and
time to trade.
As stated in Section 1, the theory of centralized versus negotiated
markets considers the alternatives "broker" and "private" as similar (see
Neeman and Vulkan, 2003) whereas the nancial market theory (see Bar-
ber and Odean, 2008) and behavioral economics theory (see Shapira and
Venezia, 1998) considers that, in most markets, the relevant distinction
is the one between professional (brokers and market makers) and non-
professional traders. Both type of intermediaries may be viewed as close
alternatives if search costs are high, or if agents wish to realize non-
standard transactions in terms of size or type of contract (swaps, loans).
On the other side, brokers and private counterparts may be viewed as
close alternatives since both trade at negotiated prices. To be able to
compare our results when considering three alternative counterparts as
independent with the literature just mentioned, we have also estimated
two simple logit models. The rst one considers brokers and private as a
joint alternative called "negotiated" (N). The second one considers bro-
kers and market makers as a joint category called "intermediaries" (I).
The estimation method is similar to the one detailed for the conditional
logit model with the simplication that the set of choices is reduced in
the rst case to J = fN;mg and in the second case to J = fI; pg.
4 Identication assumptions
We assume that the variables on the right hand side of (2)-(4) are un-
correlated with the error term in (1). A priori, one could think that this
assumption is suspect for the variable that accounts for the participation
of each alternative trading counterpart (participij) in the market. This
variable accounts for the number of brokers, market makers and privates
that participate in the market each year, and enters the equation con-
sidering one year lag. In fact, even if the number of market makers and
brokers does not change signicantly with time, the number of trans-
actions as well as the volume of transactions su¤er important changes
(compare values in Table 1 with Table 5) suggesting the non-endogeneity
of the variable participij.
We compute robust standard errors estimation for all model speci-
cations to ensure homoskedasticity.
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5 Estimation results
The results for the unrestricted model specication of the trading coun-
terpart conditional logit (CL) model are reported in Table 12-M1. Re-
sults for the baseline model are in Table 12-M2. The LR test comparing
the unrestricted model with the baseline model proves the di¤erence to
be signicant (p lower than 0.0001), favouring the unrestricted model
(see Table 16). Model 3 in Table 13-M3 shows an alternative specica-
tion where interactions between some variables are taken into account.
We have performed log-likelihood ratio (LR) tests for di¤erent groups
of explanatory variables (not reported for shortness but available upon
request). Test results show that Models M1 and M3 outperform all the
others. Moreover, coe¢ cients and odds ratio do not change signicantly
across specications and have always the expected signs meaning that
estimation is robust to changes in specication. The stability in the
value of the parameters also applies to the case of Model 4 in Table
13-M4 where we control for the e¤ect that transactions between utilities
of the same group may have on our results. With this purpose Model 4
is estimated after dropping all transactions done between accounts that
belong to the same group (i.e. 2.259 observations).
The Hausman test for IIA in Table 11 shows that the conditional
logit specication with three independent alternatives is adequate (for
a discussion on the way this result should be interpreted see Cheng and
Long, 2007).
For ease of comparison to previous literature we also estimate two
alternative models, one where brokers and private belong to a single
alternative called "negotiated" (N) (see Table 15-M8), and another one
where market makers and brokers are merged into a category called
"intermediaries" (I) (see Table 15-M9).
Finally, since it is reasonable to suspect that the abnormal behavior
of Enron during 2000 and 2001 may a¤ect our results, we estimate our
model on a sample where years 2000 and 2001 have been excluded (see
Table 14-M7). Additionally, to account for the change in preferences
that the bankruptcy of Enron may have produced, we have estimated the
model on two subsamples considering the period before and after Enron
bankruptcy, respectively (see Table 14-M5 and M6). We want to check
that estimations are not biased with respect to the relevance of market
makers when including 2000 and 2001 and to control for the possible
change in counterpart preferences in 2001, after Enrons bankruptcy.
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5.1 Market participation
Coe¢ cients and odds ratios reported in Tables 12 and 13 show the im-
portance of each explanatory variable in the buyers choice of counter-
parts. Regarding the number of possible counterparts in each category
(participij), which is a proxy of the search costs associated to each alter-
native, the results highlight that as the number of brokers increases, the
utility derived form trading with them increases signicantly whereas the
participation of an additional private trader in the market has almost no
e¤ect in the utility derived from trading with privates. Since privates
participation is very high in relation to the other types of counterparts,
the marginal utility derived from an increase in their market participa-
tion is very low with respect to the marginal utility derived from an
increase in brokers participation. This is the case because the agents
probability of nding a suited match of the type private is already high
(search costs are low).
Additionally, we nd an odds ratio associated to the market partici-
pation of market makers smaller than one. This suggests agents prefer a
relatively small number of market makers rather than many market mak-
ers, possibly each with smaller stocks available. This is in line with Miao
(2006) who, based on a search model, nds that monopolistic market-
making may improve social welfare with respect to competitive market-
making because it partially internalizes the externalities of bidask prices
on the decentralized market. In this sense, in our model agents make
their choice to maximize their utility taking this e¤ect into account.
From the study of the relevance of the variable participij on the coun-
terpart choice, we learn that agents value positively the existence of
counterparts with a clear di¤erentiation in their characteristics.
5.2 Transaction size
The way the quantity (qasci) inuences the choice of the counterpart has
no relevance when agents discriminate between a broker and a private.
The coe¢ cient is not signicant at standard levels. However, there is a
shift in preferences from private to market maker as quantity increases.
A possible explanation, borrowed from Barclay et al. (2003) and Bess-
minder and Kaufman (1997), would be the need to desegregate a single
order into multiple transactions when the size of the order is large. This
explanation underlines the role of market makers in reducing transac-
tion costs for large transactions. In fact, Barclay et al. (2003) and
Bessminder and Kaufman (1997) nd that agents seeking to trade large
quantities usually go to the centralized market to avoid doing multiple
transactions to full a single order. This result is also in line with what
we observe in Figure 4: the average volume per transaction is higher
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in the case of market makers than in the case of brokers and private
counterparts.
5.3 The regional dimension
The estimates show that the SO2 market inherits from the electricity
market a strong regional component. The estimates associated to the
variable sameri show that, when choosing a private counterpart, agents
prefer to trade inside their region. In fact, when looking at brokers,
the odds ratio associated to sameri shows that, when switching from a
counterpart in another region to a counterpart in his own region, the
preference for brokers reduces in favor of private. When looking at mar-
ket makers, the preference for market makers in relation to private also
reduces when trading inside their region. This suggests that the fact
that generators know each other and are able to use well established
communication channels reduces search and information costs, reduces
counterpart risk and uncertainty in the local permits market, and in-
creases the probability of privates to be chosen as counterparts.
When the di¤erence between the regional electricity price and the
national average is lower than the mean di¤erence between them16 we
are in the presence of a negative electricity price shock and we can expect
local abundance of inputs used for electricity production, in particular
SO2 allowances. In such cases, agents may prefer to buy permits inside
their region rather than in the nationwide market. Instead, when the
di¤erence between regional and national price is higher than the mean
di¤erence, i.e. when we are in the presence of a positive electricity price
shock, it is reasonable to think that agents may prefer to buy permits
outside of their region where permits are less scarce. When looking at
the change in the preference for brokers due to these electricity price
changes, we nd that the estimate associated to the variable difdifposi
is not signicantly di¤erent from zero in most regressions. Instead, the
estimate associated to difdifnegi shows that, when there is a negative
electricity price shock, the preference for broker increases with respect to
private. This may be due to the fact that, in the presence of an unusual
event, agents prefer to rely on professional traders that reduce search
and information costs. When the shock is negative having incentives to
trade inside their region, they trade with brokers.
When looking at the preference for market makers, the estimate as-
sociated to difdifnegi is non-signicant but the odds ratio associated to
difdifposi shows that, if the di¤erence between the regional electricity
price in the buyers region and the national average is lower than the
16The latter can be interpreted as a systematic di¤erence between regional and
national prices.
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mean di¤erence between them, the preference for market maker increases
more than one and a half times with respect to private. This strong pref-
erence for market makers when having incentives to buy permits from
outside the region suggests that agents consider the counterpart risk in
the nationwide market for SO2 to be higher than in the local market.
To account for regional heterogeneity and capture region specic
agents preferences, we control for agents main business location. Most
regional dummies are not signicant, meaning that there is no hetero-
geneity in terms of preference between agents belonging to di¤erent re-
gions.
To better understand agents preferences with respect to the re-
gional dimension, in Table 13-M3 we account for the interaction between
sameri and the regional dummies rb#i. On the one hand, if an agent
belongs to a region in which the number of private counterparts is high,
we could expect him to perceive no informational advantage from trad-
ing inside his own region due to the large scale of the local market. On
the other hand, the larger participation of privates makes it easier to
nd a private counterpart to match his demand. The aim is to assess
which of these forces prevails and to control for heterogeneity in terms of
local trading among regions. Model 3 shows that these variables are all
very signicant but not very di¤erent one from the other. This means
that in all regions rms prefer to trade with privates over other type
of counterparts when trading in the same region, but this preference is
stable across regions.
Many big rms operate more than one utility or generation plant in
the same region. As an example, SOCO, owns utilities in region 5 and re-
gion 6 of our regionalization criterion. When accounting for transactions
between accounts belonging to the same group, the importance of the
regional dimension could be overestimated. To assess the importance
of intragroup transactions as determinants of our results, we estimate
Model 4 after dropping those transactions. As shown in Table 13-M4
results remain unchanged after dropping intragroup transactions and no
coe¢ cient changes signicantly.
5.4 Changes in preferences as the market develops
As mentioned in Section 2, Phase II introduces two fundamental changes
in the SO2 market: (i) almost all fossil-fuel generators in the U.S. ter-
ritory are now included in the Acid Rain program, which increases the
number of buyers as well as the number of private counterparts, and
(ii) the cap on emissions becomes more stringent. In fact, the num-
ber of transactions with private counterparts largely increased from the
beginning of Phase II (see Figure 8). The coe¢ cient associated to phi
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accounts for the possible change in preferences due to the institutional
an regulatory changes introduced in Phase II. In all specications, our
results suggest that during Phase II agents are about twice more likely
to prefer market makers over private counterparts than in Phase I (and
more than 3 times for brokers). The increase in the preference for mar-
ket makers may be due to the increase in the counterpart identication
costs. Instead, the increase in the preference for brokers may suggest the
increasing need to desegregate a single purchase order in several transac-
tions due to the increase in the number of participants that now hold few
stocks (Figure 4 shows the decrease in the average volume of allowances
per transaction). It may also underline the reduced trading experience
of the rms included in Phase II.
Our model also includes the variables jf i and jfph2i that account for
the compliance period e¤ect (January-February trade increase detected
in Figure 5) during Phase I and Phase II, respectively. The odds ratio
associated to jf i show that, in Phase I, the preference for trading with
brokers or market makers decreases during these months. The contrary
happens when considering Phase II17. During these two months a lot of
buyers enter the market on a tight schedule (rather than for hedging or
ordinary portfolio management). This increase in allowances demand
may attract private counterparts holding stocks, since they expect to get
a better deal during these two months than what they could negotiate
during the rest of the year. This increase in the supply of private coun-
terparts in relation to brokers and market makers may be the reason
for an increase in the preference toward privates during Phase I. In fact,
during Phase I the marginal protability from an increase in the number
of private counterparts is higher than in Phase II. Moreover, during Jan-
uary and February, immediacy is more important than during the rest of
the year. The importance of immediacy could be a reason for preferring
market makers or brokers to private counterparts. This, together with
the increase in the search costs in Phase II, may explain the preference
towards brokers and market makers with respect to privates after the
year 2000.
To account for the changes in preferences across alternatives as the
market develops on a yearly basis, we include an alternative specic
non-linear time trend (ytrendj; ytrendsqj with intercept ascj). We ex-
pect to nd an increase in the role of market makers due to the increase
in counterpart risk as the complexity of the market and the number of
market participants increases. The unrestricted model suggest that, as
the market develops there is a modest decrease over time in the pref-
17This may be understood by looking at the sum of the odds ratio associated to
jfb+jfbph2 and jfm+jfmph2, respectivelly.
20
erence for brokers with respect to private counterparts. This suggests
that, all the rest being equal, preference for brokers do not change much
over time. In the case of the preference for market makers, we nd an
increase with time, in particular at the end of the period. The market
maker time trend is quite particular: while it slowly decreases during
Phase I reaching a minimum in 2001, it shows an upward trend from
2002 until 2005. This results could be thought o¤ as counterintuitive
if looking at Figure 9. Instead, market makers activity reaches a min-
imum in 2001 due to the spectacular increase of trade among privates
during that year, as shown in Figure 8. In general, we nd that trade
with private counterparts increased with time and trade with market
makers increased even more the last two years considered in the data.
5.5 The relevance of Enron
The results discussed may be biased by the abnormal behavior of Enron
during the years 2000 and 2001 or by its bankruptcy by the end of 2001.
The beginning of Phase II coincides with the last two years of Enrons
activity in the SO2 market. During these years Enron was particularly
relevant in terms of volume and number of transactions, which could be
due to fraudulent behavior. In fact, a big percentage of market makers
trade during these two years was due to Enrons trade (see Figure 7).
To assess to which extent Enrons bankruptcy induces a change in
preferences we have estimated (see Table 14), on the one hand, the coun-
terpart model on a subsample considering transactions concluded before
Enrons bankruptcy in December 2001 (see Model 5) and, on the other
hand, the counterpart model on a subsample considering transactions
from 2002 until 2005 (in Model 6). We observe that the non-linear
time trend for market makers is decreasing before Enrons bankruptcy
(considering subsample 1995-2001 in Model 5) and increasing afterwards
(considering the subsample 2002-2005 in Model 6). This is consistent
with the results based on the full sample. With respect to the rest of
the coe¢ cients, there are no signicant di¤erences between the results
in Model 5 and Model 6 as well as between these and the results based
on the full sample.
The biggest impact we observe in relation to Enrons bankruptcy
is the important substitution of market makers by brokers in 2001 in
comparison to 2000, as shown in Figure 7 and 8 (see also Figure 10
and 11 for a monthly detail). This substitution is in line with Jue et
al. (2004). The latter nd that the exit of a market maker results in
a shift of trade to brokers, but that after transition trade volumes by
alternative go back to pre-exit levels.
In the same line, to understand how Enrons abnormal activity during
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2000 and 2001 may a¤ect our results, we have estimated the counter-
part model excluding all transactions belonging to years 2000 and 2001
(in Model 7). Once more we nd that time trends are consistent with
the trends found for the full sample. The only coe¢ cients that change
signicantly18 with respect to results based on the full sample model
are the ones associated to phi. This result suggest that, when excluding
observations from years 2000 and 2001, during Phase II intermediaries
are no longer preferred to private. The results based on the full sample
show that the preference for privates increases in Phase II but that the
preference for market makers increases even more after 2002. In the es-
timation without the years 2000 and 2001 the increase in the number of
privates in 2000 is only accounted for from 2002. Then, the more than
proportional increase in the preference for market makers over privates
produced from 2002 on can no longer be appreciated.
5.6 Relevance of counterpart di¤erentiation
Finally, even if the Hausman test for IIA shows that a conditional logit
model with three independent alternatives is superior to t our data
than a conditional logit with two alternatives (see Table 11), for the
sake of comparison we have also estimated two simple logit models (see
Table 15). Model 8 shows the results for the estimation when consider-
ing negotiated trade (private and brokers) as a single alternative. The
results are in line with the results of the conditional logit model. In par-
ticular, agents prefer bilateral trade to market makers when trading in
the same region (see samei) but, when having incentives to buy permits
from outside the region (i.e. when there is a positive electricity price
shock in their own region), they prefer to trade with market makers
(see difdifposi). They also prefer market makers when placing large
orders (qasci). Moreover, time trends are also in line with our previous
results. In this specication, the coe¢ cient associated to difdifnegi is
not statistically signicant because the alternatives broker and private
belong to the same alternative N; which prevents this model to detect
the discrimination buyers do between these two options when there is a
negative electricity price shock in their region (as we have found in the
case of the conditional logit specication).
Model 9 shows the results for a logit model where intermediaries
belong to the same alternative I. Once more we nd that time trends as
well as other coe¢ cients are in line with what we found in the conditional
logit specication.
18We test:
phjFULL
 phj
2
r
V ar(phjFULL
) V ar(phj )
 and compare it with a normal distribution
N(0; 1):
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6 Goodness of t of the model
All LR tests19 performed favor the unrestricted model over any other
alternative specication. To further validate our results, we measure
the goodness of t of the model. To this end, we simulate the util-
ity derived from trading with each alternative for all transactions (and
therefore the probability of each counterpart of being chosen). To do
this, we rst compute the tted utility using (Q)ML estimates. Then,
under the distributional assumption stated in Section 3, we generate
k(= 200) draws from a standard extreme value distribution and simu-
late the utility associated to each choice for all transactions. In each
replication the selected choice is the one that maximizes utility in each
transaction. Finally, given the distribution of the choice for each trans-
action, we compute the median and 95% condence band and compare
this to the agentsobserved choices. The following three gures report
the outcome for each choice respectively, aggregated on a monthly basis.
We observe that the aggregated true choice falls into the 95% condence
band for almost all cases, showing an adequate tness of the model.
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19See Table 16 for the pseudo log likelyhood value of each specication.
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FIG. 1 Utility from trading with privates
True vs. Predicted utility derived from using a MMaker
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True vs. Predicted utility derived from using a Broker
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FIG. 3 Utility from trading with brokers
7 Concluding remarks
The utility of buying or selling a certain amount of allowances in an emis-
sion trading market does not only relies on the possibility of abating pol-
lution at a lower marginal abatement cost. There are market conditions
and counterpart characteristics that have direct inuence on the utility
derived from each specic transaction undertaken. Understanding the
preference over types of counterparts as a function of market, individ-
ual and counterpart characteristics allows us to assess the fragmented
structure of this market and the important role of professional traders in
linking local markets, reducing search and transaction costs, counterpart
risks and, in general, increasing the information available. Additionally,
we are able to understand the way agents in this market think about the
counterpart choice, how this thinking evolves with agents learning and
to which extent it is inuenced by changes in the market conguration
provoked by market regulation. All in all, these results give a wider view
of the way agents behave in emission trading markets.
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8 Appendix
Volume of trade /10.000 tons Number of trans.
Year B M P B M P
1995 4.762 32.876 1555.670 4 84 387
1996 0.026 128.193 477.114 2 144 647
1997 1.005 227.706 807.372 3 226 773
1998 0.049 351.191 616.141 4 191 1039
1999 12.478 224.129 881.407 35 208 1978
2000 40.536 326.773 1827.311 70 543 2910
2001 52.994 79.894 1844.720 102 194 4173
2002 4.938 145.282 1885.788 30 113 5511
2003 0.002 142.844 1324.790 7 234 3620
2004 1.779 191.786 1194.305 41 229 4245
2005 43.897 159.424 1479.714 105 279 4524
Total 162.464 2010.099 13894.332 403 2445 29807
B stands for broker, M for market maker and P for private
Table 1: Total number of transactions and volume/10.000 of allowances
traded per year
Average volume per transaction
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FIG. 4 Average size per transaction
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States included in each region
R1 R3 R5 R7 R9
CT IL DC AR AK
MA IN DE LA CA
ME PA FL OK HI
NH MI GA TX OR
RI OH MD WA
VT WI NC R8
SC AZ
R2 R4 VA CO
NJ IA WV ID
NY KS MT
PA MN R6 NV
MO AL NM
ND KY UT
NE MS WY
SD TN
R# stands for region #
Source: EIA
Table 2: United States Census Division
Volume per bimester
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FIG. 5 Volume/10.000 allowances per month
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FIG. 6 Counterparts contribution to trade /10.000
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FIG. 7 Intermediaries contribution to volume/10.000 of trade
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Number of transactions per counterpart chosen
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FIG. 8 Yearly number of transactions
Number of transactions per type of intermediary chosen
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FIG. 9 Transactions per type of intermediary
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Mean electricity price per region
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Transactions per bimester
Phase I
Bimester B M P
1995 1 1 4 98
2 0 9 86
3 2 18 23
4 0 14 54
5 0 12 41
6 1 27 85
1996 1 1 32 343
2 0 22 20
3 0 18 26
4 0 19 82
5 0 24 44
6 1 29 132
1997 1 0 31 386
2 0 21 25
3 1 50 73
4 0 37 56
5 1 37 62
6 1 50 171
1998 1 1 36 464
2 0 24 78
3 1 25 103
4 1 24 112
5 0 25 100
6 1 57 182
1999 1 0 16 343
2 3 25 263
3 6 24 161
4 10 59 206
5 4 35 356
6 12 49 649
Notes as in Table 1
Table 3: Number of transactions per bimester during Phase I
34
Transactions per bimester
Phase II
Bimester B M P
2000 1 8 86 720
2 3 92 333
3 10 105 384
4 17 81 320
5 9 63 412
6 23 116 741
2001 1 22 49 1916
2 21 23 589
3 17 45 296
4 19 32 353
5 11 27 321
6 12 18 698
2002 1 22 48 2368
2 5 14 916
3 0 17 558
4 1 7 725
5 0 9 443
6 2 18 501
2003 1 5 57 2207
2 1 36 257
3 1 26 192
4 0 27 279
5 0 44 282
6 0 44 403
2004 1 37 52 2733
2 0 44 258
3 0 37 240
4 2 37 305
5 2 29 248
6 0 30 461
2005 1 18 54 2694
2 3 34 344
3 1 50 346
4 2 36 441
5 11 55 282
6 70 50 417
Notes as in Table 1
Table 4: Number of transactions per bimester during Phase II
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j particip % cumul.
1995 b 2 0.84 0.84
m 4 17.68 18.53
p 138 81.47 100.00
1996 b 1 0.25 0.25
m 4 18.16 18.41
p 237 81.59 100.00
1997 b 1 0.30 0.30
m 5 22.55 22.85
p 232 77.15 100.00
1998 b 1 0.32 0.32
m 4 15.48 15.80
p 245 84.20 100.00
1999 b 4 1.58 1.58
m 5 9.37 10.94
p 279 89.06 100.00
2000 b 1 1.99 1.99
m 7 15.41 17.40
p 407 82.60 100.00
2001 b 6 2.28 2.28
m 9 4.34 6.62
p 739 93.38 100.00
2002 b 3 0.53 0.53
m 10 2.00 2.53
p 790 97.47 100.00
2003 b 2 0.18 0.18
m 10 6.06 6.24
p 859 93.76 100.00
2004 b 5 0.91 0.91
m 9 5.07 5.98
p 829 94.02 100.00
2005 b 6 2.14 2.14
m 10 5.68 7.82
p 844 92.18 100.00
Entries considered in the year of occurance,
exits considered in the following year
Table 5: Summary statistics for variable particip
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Intraregional trade
Year B M P
Volume % Volume % Volume %
1995 0.0000 0 0.0074 0 753.4639 48
1996 0.0000 0 0.2051 0 328.2033 69
1997 0.0000 0 0.8500 0 341.6997 42
1998 0.0000 0 0.0002 0 350.6834 57
1999 0.0000 0 51.7021 23 550.0722 62
2000 0.0000 0 34.1704 10 1063.428 58
2001 0.0004 0 2.2700 3 797.8148 43
2002 0.0001 0 38.8426 27 674.5595 36
2003 0.0002 10 38.9572 27 637.8758 48
2004 0.0000 0 32.3942 17 587.0621 49
2005 0.2500 1 30.1862 19 848.4953 57
Total 0.2507 0 229.5854 11 6933.358 50
National trade
B M P
Year Volume % Volume % Volume %
1995 4.7619 100 32.8688 100 802.2061 52
1996 0.0257 100 127.9883 100 148.9105 31
1997 1.0045 100 226.8563 100 465.6727 58
1998 0.0487 100 351.1904 100 265.4571 43
1999 12.4783 100 172.4268 77 331.3347 38
2000 40.5355 100 292.6028 90 763.8830 42
2001 52.9931 100 77.6243 97 1046.9052 57
2002 4.9379 100 106.4390 73 1211.2285 64
2003 0.0018 90 103.8867 73 686.9142 52
2004 1.7791 100 159.3920 83 607.2429 51
2005 43.6470 99 129.2377 81 631.2187 43
Total 162.2135 100 1780.5131 89 6960.9736 50
% is the percentage calculated for each alternative
Table 6: Regional and national Volume/10.000 tons
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Intraregional trade
B M P
Year Trans. % Trans. % Trans. %
1995 0 0 2 2 172 44
1996 0 0 3 2 396 61
1997 0 0 3 1 522 68
1998 0 0 2 1 569 55
1999 0 0 14 7 870 44
2000 0 0 22 4 1054 36
2001 1 1 3 2 2069 50
2002 1 3 15 13 2332 42
2003 1 14 13 6 1929 53
2004 0 0 19 8 2493 59
2005 1 1 43 15 2822 62
Total 4 1 139 6 15228 51
National trade
B M P
Year Trans. % Trans. % Trans. %
1995 4 100 82 98 215 56
1996 2 100 141 98 251 39
1997 3 100 223 99 251 32
1998 4 100 189 99 470 45
1999 35 100 194 93 1108 56
2000 70 100 521 96 1856 64
2001 101 99 191 98 2104 50
2002 29 97 98 87 3179 58
2003 6 86 221 94 1691 47
2004 41 100 210 92 1752 41
2005 104 99 236 85 1702 38
Total 399 99 2306 94 14579 49
Notes as in Table 6
Table 7: Regional and national number of transactions.
samer frequency % cumul.
0 17410 53.02 53.02
1 15426 46.98 100
Table 8: Transactions that take place inside the same region
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Variable mean SD min Max
difdifpos 0.38 0.76 0.00 4.13
difdifneg 0.38 0.37 0.00 1.62
qasc 0.52 2.23 0.00 185.10
SD stands for standard deviation
Table 9: Summary statistics for price and quantity variables
R freq. % cumul.
1 689 2.10 2.10
2 5775 17.53 19.62
3 8659 26.37 46.00
4 2566 7.81 53.81
5 6250 19.03 72.84
6 2466 7.51 80.35
7 2310 7.03 87.39
8 2942 8.96 96.35
9 910 2.77 99.12
USA 289 0.88 100
Notes as in Table 5
Table 10: Quantity of private buyers in each region
Ho: Odds are independent of other alternatives.
Chi-squared Dickey-Fuller p>Chi-squared Result
b 0.909 19 1 for Ho
m -1.58 18 1 for Ho
Alternatives in the regressions dependent variable are fp; b;mg
Table 11: Hausman Test for IIA
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M1: Unrestricted M2: Baseline
Variable Coef. SE Odds Ratio Coef. SE Odds Ratio
ascb -3.74 ** 0.68 0.02 -4.18 ** 0.69 0.02
ascm 0.58 * 0.32 1.79 0.39 0.28 1.47
ytrendb -0.22 0.14 0.80 -0.20 0.14 0.82
ytrendm -0.33 ** 0.05 0.72 -0.31 ** 0.04 0.74
ytrendsqb 0.01 * 0.01 1.01 0.01 * 0.01 1.01
ytrendsqm 0.03 ** 0.00 1.03 0.03 ** 0.00 1.03
participb 0.35 ** 0.03 1.41 0.33 ** 0.03 1.39
participm -0.12 ** 0.05 0.88 -0.13 ** 0.05 0.88
participp 0.00 ** 0.00 1.00 0.00 ** 0.00 1.00
phb 1.24 ** 0.30 3.47 1.63 ** 0.29 5.10
phm 0.64 ** 0.12 1.90 0.90 ** 0.11 2.46
jfb -1.23 ** 0.59 0.29 -0.79 ** 0.12 0.45
jfm -0.73 ** 0.12 0.48 -1.12 ** 0.06 0.33
jfbph2 1.31 ** 0.60 3.71
jfmph2 0.24 * 0.13 1.27
qascb -0.09 0.06 0.92
qascm 0.02 ** 0.01 1.02
samerb -4.72 ** 0.51 0.01
samerm -2.78 ** 0.10 0.06
difdifposb 0.35 0.22 1.42
difdifposm 0.55 ** 0.09 1.73
difdifnegb 1.25 ** 0.28 3.49
difdifnegm 0.12 0.12 1.12
rb1b 0.31 0.98 1.37 1.33 ** 0.63 3.79
rb1m -0.79 * 0.42 0.45 0.78 ** 0.25 2.19
rb2b 0.43 0.67 1.54 0.41 0.60 1.50
rb2m 0.17 0.28 1.18 0.47 ** 0.22 1.61
rb3b 0.44 0.63 1.55 0.28 0.60 1.32
rb3m 0.69 ** 0.26 2.00 0.12 0.22 1.13
rb4b 0.09 0.65 1.09 0.62 0.61 1.86
rb4m 0.35 0.27 1.41 0.15 0.23 1.16
rb5b -0.40 0.64 0.67 -0.06 0.61 0.95
rb5m -0.01 0.26 0.99 -0.16 0.23 0.85
rb6b -1.54 ** 0.74 0.21 -0.53 0.65 0.59
rb6m -0.13 0.30 0.88 -0.24 0.24 0.79
rb7b 0.39 0.63 1.48 0.50 0.61 1.65
rb7m 0.32 0.27 1.37 0.34 0.24 1.41
rb8b 0.28 0.63 1.33 0.36 0.61 1.43
rb8m 0.57 ** 0.26 1.77 0.34 0.23 1.41
rb9b -0.76 1.01 0.47 -0.43 0.74 0.65
rb9m -0.98 ** 0.40 0.38 -0.40 0.28 0.67
** indicates signicance at 5%; * indicates signicance at 10%
Table 12: Conditional Logit Models
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M3: Interactions M4: Non-intragroup
Variable Coef. SE OR Coef. SE OR
ascb -3.25 ** 0.37 0.04 -3.77 ** 0.68 0.02
ascm 1.10 ** 0.20 3.02 0.51 0.32 1.67
ytrendb -0.28 * 0.13 0.76 -0.22 0.14 0.80
ytrendm -0.33 ** 0.04 0.72 -0.31 ** 0.05 0.73
ytrendsqb 0.02 ** 0.01 1.02 0.01 * 0.01 1.01
ytrendsqm 0.04 ** 0.00 1.04 0.03 ** 0.00 1.03
participb 0.36 ** 0.03 1.44 0.35 ** 0.03 1.41
participm -0.12 ** 0.05 0.89 -0.13 ** 0.05 0.88
participp 0.00 ** 0.00 1.00 0.00 ** 0.00 1.00
phb 1.39 ** 0.29 4.01 1.23 ** 0.30 3.41
phm 0.69 ** 0.12 1.99 0.64 ** 0.12 1.90
jfb -1.22 ** 0.59 0.30 -1.23 ** 0.59 0.29
jfm -0.62 ** 0.12 0.54 -0.76 ** 0.12 0.47
jfbph2 1.17 ** 0.60 3.22 1.33 ** 0.60 3.77
jfmph2 0.12 0.14 1.13 0.29 ** 0.14 1.34
qascb -0.05 0.05 0.95 -0.08 0.06 0.92
qascm 0.01 ** 0.01 1.01 0.05 ** 0.01 1.05
samerb 2.50 ** 0.63 12.24 -4.58 ** 0.51 0.01
samerm 2.30 ** 0.32 9.96 -2.66 ** 0.10 0.07
difdifposb 0.25 ** 0.07 1.29 0.36 * 0.22 1.44
difdifposm 0.12 ** 0.03 1.12 0.57 ** 0.09 1.76
difdifnegb 0.38 ** 0.16 1.47 1.23 ** 0.28 3.44
difdifnegm -0.18 ** 0.08 0.84 0.12 0.12 1.12
rxb1b -21.74 ** 0.68 0.00 rb1b 0.28 0.99 1.32
rxb1m -5.15 ** 0.67 0.01 rb1m -0.82 * 0.43 0.44
rxb2b -21.11 ** 0.64 0.00 rb2b 0.43 0.67 1.54
rxb2m -3.60 ** 0.33 0.03 rb2m 0.16 0.28 1.17
rxb3b -21.11 ** 0.63 0.00 rb3b 0.45 0.63 1.57
rxb3m -22.56 ** 0.32 0.00 rb3m 0.70 ** 0.26 2.01
rxb4b -21.27 ** 0.64 0.00 rb4b 0.10 0.65 1.10
rxb4m -22.44 ** 0.32 0.00 rb4m 0.35 0.27 1.42
rxb5b -21.25 ** 0.63 0.00 rb5b -0.38 0.64 0.68
rxb5m -22.32 ** 0.32 0.00 rb5m 0.00 0.26 1.00
rxb6b -21.48 ** 0.66 0.00 rb6b -1.51 ** 0.74 0.22
rxb6m -22.18 ** 0.33 0.00 rb6m -0.10 0.30 0.90
rxb7b -5.58 ** 1.19 0.00 rb7b 0.43 0.63 1.53
rxb7m -22.28 ** 0.32 0.00 rb7m 0.36 0.27 1.43
rxb8b -21.09 ** 0.63 0.00 rb8b 0.30 0.63 1.35
rxb8m -22.59 ** 0.32 0.00 rb8m 0.58 ** 0.26 1.78
rxb9b -21.42 ** 0.64 0.00 rb9b -0.79 1.01 0.46
rxb9m -22.96 ** 0.32 0.00 rb9m -1.00 ** 0.41 0.37
Notes as in Table 12; OR are Odds Ratio; rxb1b = samer  rb1b
Table 13: Alternative especications
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M5: Before 01 M6: After 01 M7: Without 00-01
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
ascb -5.33 ** 1.37 16.51 * 9.32 -7.17 ** 0.93
ascm -1.53 ** 0.45 -33.90 ** 3.70 -2.02 ** 0.46
ytrendb 0.02 0.39 -6.22 ** 2.04 -0.95 ** 0.18
ytrendm 0.35 ** 0.12 5.05 ** 0.90 -0.93 ** 0.07
ytrendsqb 0.03 0.04 0.35 ** 0.10 0.02 0.01
ytrendsqm -0.07 ** 0.02 -0.25 ** 0.05 0.06 ** 0.00
particip 0.00 0.00 -0.01 ** 0.00
participb 0.90 ** 0.15
participm -0.21 ** 0.07
participp -0.01 ** 0.00
phb -6.57 ** 0.88
phm -7.70 ** 0.73
jfb -0.54 ** 0.20 0.60 ** 0.16 -1.04 * 0.60
jfm -0.46 ** 0.08 -0.80 ** 0.09 -0.83 ** 0.12
jfbph2 1.54 ** 0.62
jfmph2 0.08 0.15
qascb -0.01 0.04 -0.31 0.25 -0.25 0.16
qascm 0.02 ** 0.01 0.19 ** 0.05 0.06 ** 0.01
samerb -5.19 ** 1.00 -4.54 ** 0.61 -4.72 ** 0.60
samerm -3.47 ** 0.16 -2.17 ** 0.12 -2.70 ** 0.11
difdifposb 0.14 0.45 0.34 0.26 0.31 0.26
difdifposm 0.50 ** 0.15 0.43 ** 0.13 0.57 ** 0.11
difdifnegb 0.49 0.41 2.84 ** 0.41 1.85 ** 0.34
difdifnegm 0.40 ** 0.17 0.58 ** 0.25 0.33 ** 0.14
Notes as in Table 12
Table 14: Analysis of the e¤ect of Enrons banckrupcy
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M8: N vs. m M9: p vs. I
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE
asc 1.86 ** 0.40 0.68 ** 0.30
ytrend -0.34 ** 0.05 -0.31 ** 0.05
ytrendsq 0.03 ** 0.00 0.03 ** 0.00
particN 0.00 ** 0.00
particm -0.31 ** 0.06
particI -0.06 ** 0.02
particp 0.00 ** 0.00
ph -0.83 ** 0.12 -0.36 ** 0.09
jf -0.74 ** 0.12 -0.77 ** 0.11
jfph2 0.22 * 0.13 0.38 ** 0.13
same -2.75 ** 0.10 -2.92 ** 0.09
qasc 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01
difdifpos 0.54 ** 0.09 0.57 ** 0.09
difdifneg 0.06 0.12 0.26 ** 0.11
Dependent variable is 1 for m in M8 and for I in M9
Notes as in Table 12
Table 15: Logit Models
PseudoLL PseudoR2 Obs. Par.
M1 -8702.96 0.76 32655 41
M2 -9845.87 0.73 32655 31
M3 -8540.00 0.76 32655 41
M4 -8662.77 0.74 30396 41
M5 -4845.19 0.68 13717 35
M6 -3665.81 0.82 18938 35
M7 -5813.37 0.79 24663 41
M8 -6946.96 0.20 32655 20
M9 -7694.83 0.20 32655 20
Table 16: Fitness of the di¤erent especications
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